Rita Sawyer v. Superintendent Muncy SCI by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-10-2015 
Rita Sawyer v. Superintendent Muncy SCI 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Rita Sawyer v. Superintendent Muncy SCI" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 854. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/854 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No.  13-4446 
________________ 
 
RITA SAWYER, 
                          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT MUNCY SCI; ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PENNSYLVANIA; DISTRICT ATTORNEY LEBANON COUNTY  
                           
 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-12-cv-01269)  
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell 
________________ 
 
Argued:  November 21, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  August 10, 2015) 
 
Norris E. Gelman, Esq. 
2000 Market Street 
Suite 2940 
Philadelphia, PA  19103 
 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Sarah K. Hart, Esq. [ARGUED] 
David J. Arnold, Jr., Esq. 
Lebanon County Office of District Attorney 
400 South 8th Street 
Municipal Building, Room 11 
2 
 
Lebanon, PA  17042 
 
 Counsel for Appellees 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
Rita Sawyer appeals the denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking 
relief from her first-degree murder conviction. She contends that, under the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the decision of the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 
of,” the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). We 
disagree, and will affirm. 
I. 
A. 
At the time of her mother’s death, Sawyer, 47 and single, was an anesthesiologist 
struggling with depression and alcoholism. She had made plans to enter an inpatient 
rehabilitation program on June 21, 2004. Her mother, Mary Sawyer, lived at a nursing 
home nearby. At 79, Mary suffered from dementia and did not recognize Sawyer, 
although the two had been very close. Sawyer, among her siblings, took primary 
responsibility for visiting her mother.  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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The night before she was to enter the inpatient rehabilitation facility, Sawyer took 
her mother home for an overnight visit. Sawyer had never signed Mary out before and did 
not inform any friends or family that she was doing so. Nurses thought Sawyer was in a 
hurry because she declined to take a wheelchair for her arthritic mother and accepted a 
bag with Mary’s incontinence briefs and medications only after they urged it upon her.  
The next morning, Marjorie Merchant, Sawyer’s friend and the wife of Sawyer’s 
medical partner, went to Sawyer’s house and found Sawyer attempting suicide in her car 
with the engine running in her closed garage. Coaxing Sawyer into the fresh air outside 
and stalling her until a driver from the rehabilitation facility arrived, Merchant observed 
that Sawyer was impaired and behaving almost robotically. Merchant then found and 
packed a suitcase for Sawyer to take to the rehabilitation facility because Sawyer was 
unable to do so herself.  
On the way to the rehabilitation facility, Sawyer told the driver her mother had 
died and was in bed at her home. Mary’s body was subsequently found in the bedroom, 
where police also located a syringe on a nearby dresser and a pillow with Mary’s saliva 
on the floor. The incontinence briefs were still in Sawyer’s car, where police found a 
suicide note and a cooking pot with four emptied bottles of Sevoflurane, an inhalational 
anesthetic. That evening, Sawyer called her sister and said their mother had died. She 
added, “I don’t know what I did.”  
Dr. Barbara Bollinger performed an autopsy the next day. She ruled the death a 
homicide by asphyxia and drugging based on her findings of blunt trauma to the neck (a 
subcutaneous bruise on the right side of Mary’s larynx), petechiae (small hemorrhages) in 
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each eye, and the administration of Versed (midazolam), an anesthetic used to sedate 
patients before surgery.  
Police then interviewed Sawyer, who admitted giving Mary a shot of brandy and 
possibly an injection of Versed so Mary would sleep. But she could not entirely recall, 
she told police, because she suffered an alcoholic blackout after she consumed the fifth of 
brandy. When police asked her whether she had killed her mother, she replied, “I don’t 
think so. I don’t see that I would have.” Later during Sawyer’s rehabilitation stay, police 
recovered Sawyer’s diary, which contained several entries, likely written during 
rehabilitation. The prosecution claimed that the entries failed to show grief and instead 
revealed Sawyer’s feelings of anger and bitterness towards her parents for having to 
please them and later take care of them.  
B. 
The Commonwealth charged Sawyer with first-degree murder and the unlawful 
administration of a controlled substance.1 At trial, the cause of Mary’s death was a central 
issue, and the Commonwealth’s case was based on circumstantial evidence. The 
prosecution argued that Sawyer had suffocated her mother by smothering her with the 
pillow while simultaneously applying pressure on her jugular vein. Although Dr. 
Bollinger conceded that Mary suffered from severe arterial blockage, which “by itself 
could be a cause of death” (although she asserted that “in this case, it was not”), she 
opined that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, “[t]he manner of death is 
                                              
1 Pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann §§ 2501(a) (criminal homicide) and 2502(1) 
(first-degree murder) and 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(14) (unlawful administration of 
a controlled substance).  
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homicide.” She also conceded that petechiae could appear for various reasons, such as 
straining at constipation, severe coughs, and other everyday occurrences; and admitted 
that she had never applied this exact theory to any of the cases she had seen before. But 
she suggested that the Versed’s sedative effect might explain why Mary had no scratches 
on her neck (which otherwise might signify a struggle), and a supporting prosecution 
expert corroborated Dr. Bollinger’s overall analysis by opining that the bruise deep in 
Mary’s neck, in the absence of a mark on the skin, could have resulted from “pressure in 
the area [of] the thyrohyoid . . . against the tracheal cartilage,” thereby causing 
“squeeze[ing] between the force and the cartilage.”  
By contrast, defense expert Dr. Michael Baden testified that to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty Mary died of a fatal cardioarythmia resulting from plaque buildup in 
her coronary arteries that narrowed all three by 60 to 80 percent. He opined that Mary’s 
body showed no signs of strangulation even though oxygen starvation usually results in 
signs of a struggle. In addition, a supporting defense expert observed without 
contradiction that the Versed in Mary’s system was “a very small amount” that “would 
have very, very minimal [e]ffect and would have no [e]ffect on respiration or level of 
consciousness.” He further noted that midazolam, in any quantity, “has never been 
implicated with regard to respiratory death,” although Dr. Baden conceded “it is unusual 
to give Versed for sleep.” 
Notably, Dr. Baden thought the prosecution’s theory was strangulation and 
appeared unaware that the prosecution would instead press a suffocation theory because, 
he explained, “suffocation does not involve blunt trauma to the neck.” He conceded, 
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however, that “[s]uffocation may not show any physical manifestations.”  
II. 
A.  
Under Pennsylvania’s corpus delicti2 rule, the Commonwealth must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the charged crime has been committed before using the 
defendant’s inculpatory statements to connect her to the crime. E.g., Jacobs v. Horn, 395 
F.3d 92, 109 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Verticelli, 706 A.2d 820, 824 (Pa. 
1998), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Taylor, 831 A.2d 587 (Pa. 
2003). “In a murder prosecution, the corpus delicti consists of evidence that an individual 
is dead and that the death resulted from criminal means.” Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 109 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Tallon, 387 A.2d 77, 80 (Pa. 1978)). The rule applies in two steps: 
first, the trial judge must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that a crime has 
been committed. Commonwealth v. Reyes, 681 A.2d 724, 727-28 (Pa. 1996). The jury 
then must find the same beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, a specific “jury 
instruction . . . is . . . crucial” to prevent the “dilut[ion of] the Commonwealth’s burden of 
proof.” Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 657 A.2d 518, 521-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).  
B. 
At Sawyer’s trial, the trial judge found the prosecution had satisfied the first step 
of the corpus delicti rule and permitted it to introduce Sawyer’s diary entries and her 
statements to her sister and the police. At closing argument, the prosecution used these 
                                              
2 “Corpus delicti” is Latin for “body of the crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 419 (10th 
ed. 2014). 
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inculpatory statements as evidence of Sawyer’s guilt. In particular, the prosecution 
argued that Sawyer’s answer of “I don’t think so” to the police’s question whether she 
killed her mother lacked “righteous indignation” and was inconsistent with Sawyer’s 
claim of having suffered an alcoholic blackout.  
Sawyer’s lawyer did not request a corpus delicti jury instruction and the court did 
not give one. Instead, the court instructed the jury that “medical testimony may be too 
uncertain to establish criminal causation beyond a reasonable doubt” and observed that 
“Sawyer alleges that against her the proof here concerned is the pathologist’s findings of 
petechiae, a subcutaneous bruise on the right side of Mary Sawyer’s larynx and 
administration of an unknown quantity of a sedative, Versed.” It instructed, “You must 
decide as the finders of fact whether this evidence proves causation beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  
On October 10, 2005, after a weeklong trial, the jury convicted Sawyer of first- 
degree murder and the unlawful administration of a drug. She was sentenced to life in 
prison.3  
III. 
A. 
On postconviction review before the state trial court (“PCRA court”4), Sawyer 
asserted her trial counsel had been ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
                                              
3 Sawyer received a life sentence for the first-degree murder conviction and 15 years, 
to run concurrently, for the unlawful administration of a drug. Super Ct. Op. 5.  
4 So-called after Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9541 et seq. 
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668, in failing to request a corpus delicti instruction.5 Under Strickland, Sawyer had to 
show “there [wa]s a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.  
The PCRA court initially held Sawyer to a standard less stringent than 
Strickland’s. Despite opining that, on the strength of the evidence presented at trial,6 “the 
failure to request the corpus delicti instruction was harmless error,” the PCRA court 
found the so-called harmless error to be ineffective assistance of counsel and ordered a 
new trial. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed and remanded for 
application of Strickland’s prejudice standard.  
On remand, the PCRA court denied relief in a single-page order stating that 
Sawyer could not “establish there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” The Pennsylvania 
Superior Court affirmed because Sawyer had “not established that counsel’s failure to 
request a corpus delicti instruction resulted in prejudice.” Super. Ct. Op. 9.7 In particular, 
the court reasoned that “the compelling evidence of Appellant’s guilt leads to the 
conclusion that Appellant cannot establish the jury would have acquitted her had it 
received a specific corpus delicti instruction.” Id. at 10. 
                                              
5 Sawyer’s trial counsel filed a direct appeal, which current counsel subsequently 
withdrew in favor of postconviction proceedings.  
6 The PCRA judge was the same judge who presided over Sawyer’s criminal trial.  
7 The Superior Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Sawyer, No. 2 MDA 2010 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2011), is attached to Sawyer’s brief as Exhibit C. Only the disposition 
is reported at 26 A.3d 1185 (table).  
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B. 
Sawyer then filed the instant habeas petition in federal court. She argued, as the 
District Court recited, that the Pennsylvania Superior Court had erroneously evaluated 
her corpus delicti–based Strickland claim under a “but for” standard instead of the proper 
Strickland prejudice standard. See Sawyer v. Drioux, No. 12-1269, 2013 WL 5755428, at 
*9 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2013). Sawyer contended she needed to show only that “there was 
a reasonable probability that the failure to give a corpus delicti instruction undermined 
confidence in the outcome,” not that “the jury would have acquitted her had they been 
given a corpus delicti instruction.” Id.  
The District Court denied Sawyer’s habeas petition because she could not “show 
that the superior court’s resolution of the corpus delicti claim was contrary to Strickland 
or an unreasonable application of Strickland” under AEDPA § 2254(d)(1). Id. The 
District Court noted that the Pennsylvania Superior Court had “set forth a three-prong 
state-law test for ineffectiveness . . . equivalent of the Strickland standard,” and that the 
Superior Court’s subsequent “use of ‘shorthand’ language in its prejudice analysis does 
not in itself mean that it did not follow Strickland.” Id. (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 
537 U.S. 19, 23-24 (2002) (per curiam)). The District Court also concluded the Superior 
Court had not unreasonably applied Strickland in “look[ing] at the instructions as a 
whole.” Id. at *10. The District Court observed that the instructions “put the burden of 
proof on the Commonwealth to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” Id. Further, the court noted, the Superior Court “looked to the evidence at trial 
and decided that the outcome would not have been different, or in Strickland terms, that 
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there was no reasonable probability that the result would have been different.” Id. On its 
own review of the evidence, the District Court could not “conclude that this ruling was 
unreasonable under Strickland.” Id.  
IV.8 
Under AEDPA, federal judicial review of a state court’s postconviction merits 
decision is limited to determining whether the state court adjudication “resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).9 Because the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision is consistent 
with Strickland in both these respects, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Sawyer’s § 2254 petition.  
A. 
1. 
                                              
8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a). On 
Sawyer’s timely motion, we issued a certificate of appealability to review whether the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s resolution of Sawyer’s claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request a corpus delicti jury instruction “was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(c); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-38 (2003). We denied Sawyer’s 
request for a certificate of appealability as to her Strickland claim based on counsel’s 
failure to object to the trial court’s jury instructions concerning voluntary intoxication 
because Sawyer failed to make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
right” with regard to that claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  
9 If a state court’s adjudication results in a decision contrary to, or involves the 
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent, federal review proceeds de novo. 
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393-98, 406 (2000) (“[A] federal court will 
be unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1) because the state-court decision falls within that 
provision’s ‘contrary to’ clause.”).  
11 
 
Under § 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA, “[a] state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ [the 
Supreme Court’s] clearly established precedents if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the 
governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are 
materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and nevertheless arrives at a 
result different from [the Court’s] precedent.’” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per 
curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). “Avoiding these 
pitfalls does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases—indeed, it does not even 
require awareness of [those] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the 
state-court decision contradicts them.” Id.; see also, e.g., Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 
394, 398 (3d Cir. 2004). In essence, § 2254(d)(1) “demands that state-court decisions be 
given the benefit of the doubt,” and the Supreme Court has cautioned lower courts 
against any “readiness to attribute error” by failing to “presum[e] that state courts know 
and follow the law.” Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24.  
2. 
“Strickland held that to prove prejudice the defendant must establish a ‘reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different’; it specifically rejected the proposition that the defendant had 
to prove it more likely than not that the outcome would have been altered.” Visciotti, 537 
U.S. at 22 (emphasis in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). But although the 
Supreme Court has stated that a state court’s decision will be contrary to Strickland if it 
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holds the defendant to such a preponderance of the evidence standard,10 the Court has 
also set out particular guidelines for how a state court’s decision must be interpreted.  
In Woodford v. Visciotti, the Court found that the state court had “expressed and 
applied the proper standard for evaluating prejudice,” id., even though it had “used the 
term ‘probable’ without the modifier ‘reasonably’” in four places, id. at 23. The Court 
observed that the state court had twice correctly set out “the ‘reasonable probability’ 
criterion, with a citation of the relevant passage in Strickland,” id. at 22, as well as 
accurately discussed Strickland’s “[u]ndermin[ing] confidence” language, id. at 23 
(second alteration in original). While the state court’s “occasional shorthand reference to 
th[e Strickland] standard by use of the term ‘probable’ without the modifier may perhaps 
be imprecise, . . . it can no more be considered a repudiation of the standard than can th[e 
Supreme] Court’s own occasional indulgence in the same imprecision.” Id. at 23-24. And 
subsequently, in Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004) (per curiam), the Court 
suggested it does not consider the words “would not have” to “imply any particular 
standard of probability,” id. at 654, especially “when the complete Strickland standard is 
elsewhere recited,” id. at 655. See also, e.g., Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212, 1226-27 
(10th Cir. 2014). 
                                              
10 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06 (“If a state court were to reject a prisoner’s claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding would have 
been different, that decision would be ‘diametrically different,’ ‘opposite in character or 
nature,’ and ‘mutually opposed’ to our clearly established precedent because we held in 
Strickland that the prisoner need only demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability that . . . the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.’” (quoting, inter alia, Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694)).  
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In addition, the Supreme Court observed in Jackson that under § 2254(d)(1) a 
federal court should not “needlessly create internal inconsistency in [a state court’s] 
opinion” when the state court’s language can be “reasonably read” as consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent. 542 U.S. at 654 (holding that where “[t]he state court began by 
reciting the correct Strickland standard” but later used “the unadorned word ‘probably,’” 
the state court had not incorrectly applied a preponderance standard, and declining to 
“needlessly create internal inconsistency in the opinion” by reading another statement to 
refer to prejudice when context indicated it was “reasonably read as addressing the 
general burden of proof in postconviction proceedings”). Together, Visciotti and Jackson 
clarify that the Supreme Court’s command to give state courts “‘the benefit of the doubt’” 
is a directive to presume, “absent an affirmative indication to the contrary, . . . that state 
courts ‘know and follow the law.’” See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455-56 (2005) (per 
curiam) (quoting Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24)). Most relevant court of appeals decisions 
agree that where a reading of the state court’s opinion as a whole demonstrates that the 
state court applied the correct legal standard (notwithstanding stray imprecise 
articulations), the federal habeas court is to defer to the state court’s decision.11  
                                              
11 See, e.g., Frost, 749 F.3d at 1226-27 (“[W]hen viewed in its entirety, the [state 
court’s] proper articulation of the prejudice standard in other parts of its opinion confirms 
that it was not relying on an impermissible ‘more likely than not’ preponderance 
standard.”); Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2009); Charles v. 
Stephens, 736 F.3d 380, 392-93 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 52 
(2014); Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 832 (8th Cir. 2012); Sussman v. Jenkins, 636 
F.3d 329, 359-60 (7th Cir. 2011); Stanley v. Bartley, 465 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(reasoning that simply stating the standard incorrectly once, after stating it correctly 
before, is unlikely to overcome the presumption that the state court knows the law); 
Ventura v. Att’y Gen., 419 F.3d 1269, 1284-86 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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B. 
Sawyer contends the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s denial of her ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was contrary to Strickland because the court applied an 
unadorned but-for standard requiring her to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that she would have been acquitted, rather than require that she “only demonstrate a 
‘reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In particular, she points 
to the court’s statement that she “cannot establish the jury would have acquitted her had it 
received a specific corpus delicti instruction.” Super. Ct. Op. 10.  
On review of the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s opinion as a whole, however, we 
cannot find any “affirmative indication” to rebut the presumption that the court “kn[e]w 
and follow[ed] the law.” Cone, 543 U.S. at 456 (quoting Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24). The 
Superior Court twice stated Strickland’s ineffective assistance of counsel standard 
unassailably. First, in reviewing procedural history, the court stated that “[u]pon remand, 
the PCRA court found that, based on its review of the entire record, ‘[Sawyer] cannot 
establish there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of 
the proceeding would have been different.’” Super. Ct. Op. 6. Second, the Superior Court 
stated the standard, with express reference to Strickland, as requiring Sawyer to show that 
“but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.” Id. at 7 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 
A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010)). Given the presumption that state courts know and follow the 
law and the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s correct articulation of the Strickland standard, 
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we are constrained to read the statement Sawyer has identified as “shorthand” under 
Visciotti.  
Moreover, the absence of an adverb in the statement Sawyer points to is at best 
ambiguous, and without more we may not “needlessly create internal inconsistency in 
[an] opinion,” Jackson, 542 U.S. at 654, that earlier articulates the standard correctly 
while citing Strickland. Reading the opinion as a whole, we note that the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court explicitly interpreted the jury instructions as “emphasiz[ing] that the jury 
must find that evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mary’s death resulted 
from criminal conduct and not natural causes.” Super. Ct. Op. 10. In the District Court’s 
words, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that these instructions were “essentially 
corpus delicti instructions.” 2013 WL 5755428, at *10. Further, the context of the 
language Sawyer highlights does not support her reading. The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court stated, “[T]he compelling evidence of [Sawyer’s] guilt leads to the conclusion that 
[Sawyer] cannot establish the jury would have acquitted her had it received a specific 
corpus delicti instruction,” Super. Ct. Op. 10 (emphasis added), and then summarized this 
“compelling evidence,” which was limited to evidence not subject to attack under the 
corpus delicti rule, see id. at 10-11. Because we understand the “fair import” of the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision to comply with Strickland, we cannot overrule it 
under § 2254(d)(1) for want of a more precise “formulary statement.” See Packer, 537 
U.S. at 9.  
C. 
Nor can Sawyer show the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s application of Strickland 
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was unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA. “[I]f there was a reasonable 
justification for the state court’s decision,” we may not disturb it. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 
109. As we have noted, the Superior Court found the circumstantial evidence of Sawyer’s 
guilt, outside of her inculpatory statements, “compelling.”12 Although we might not 
independently agree with that characterization, we cannot find unreasonable the Superior 
Court’s determination that this circumstantial evidence was sufficient to overcome 
Strickland’s reasonable probability of a different result. See also generally, e.g., Brown v. 
Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 632 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The proper question was whether fair-
minded jurists could agree with the Superior Court, not whether it erred in denying 
relief.”). The Superior Court observed that the trial court gave a criminal causation 
instruction referring specifically to the medical testimony, and reasoned that the jury 
could have “believe[d] the Commonwealth’s expert testimony explaining how the 
autopsy and toxicology results supported its conclusion that Mary’s death was a 
homicide.” Super. Ct. Op. 10. We cannot say this conclusion, given the medical 
                                              
12 The Pennsylvania Superior Court identified the following evidence:  
[A]lthough she had never done so before, Appellant took Mary out for an 
overnight visit when she had to leave for rehabilitation early the next 
morning and did not tell any of her family or friends she was doing so. 
Appellant seemed to disregard the nurses’ instructions for her mother’s care 
and gave her elderly mother alcohol and an injection of anesthetic which 
she was not prescribed. Appellant delayed notifying her siblings of Mary’s 
death, but informed her veterinarian who was scheduled to visit Appellant’s 
home that morning to see Appellant’s horse.  
Super Ct. Op. 10-11. We think this evidence, even if it encompasses some of Sawyer’s 
statements, was not covered by the corpus delicti rule. See Verticelli, 706 A.2d at 824 
(noting that a statement is inculpatory if it “specifically connects [the defendant] to 
criminal activity,” and that only material inculpatory statements, and not “all statements,” 
“are subject to the corpus delicti rule”). 
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testimony instruction and the mismatch between the prosecution’s suffocation theory and 
Dr. Baden’s strangulation defense, was unreasonable. In addition, the circumstantial 
evidence the Superior Court identified was probative of not only criminal causation, but 
also Sawyer’s involvement.  
Accordingly, although we find Sawyer’s first-degree murder conviction to be 
harsh, especially in light of her impairment13 and the surrounding circumstances, we do 
not believe the Superior Court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable.  
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Sawyer’s 
habeas petition.  
                                              
13 Sawyer’s mother died sometime during the early morning hours of Monday, June 21, 
2004. Sawyer introduced evidence that her blood alcohol content was .380% at midnight 
of June 20, 2004, .272% at 6:00 a.m. on June 21, and .127% at 2:57 p.m. on June 21. 
Sawyer, 2013 WL 5755428, at *9. 
